Defending Planet Politics
by Stefanie Fishel, Anthony Burke, Audra Mitchell, Simon Dalby and Daniel Levine
*This text is a final preprint of our response to the critique of the Planet Politics manifesto published in Millennium by David Chandler, Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden. Both can be viewed in the Online first section of the journal. I will update with links to the final published issue in the new year. Readers wishing to use this material for teaching or citation purposes must use the published version.
Weird ambition, bit like a cop, to be someone’s guilty conscience.
– Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations
Since the article ‘Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR’ (hereafter the Manifesto) was published in 2016, it has provoked discussion and debate in multiple forums. Sessions have been dedicated to it at the 2016 European Workshop on International Studies on ‘Politics in the Anthropocene’, the R.J. Vincent Colloquium at the Australian National University, the Oceanic Conference on International Studies in Brisbane, in two roundtables at the 2017 ISA in Baltimore, and this October at the Earth System Governance Conference. In May 2017, Joseph Camilleri dedicated a web forum with 12 contributors to the question, ‘Can world politics save planet Earth?’ The 2017 Millennium Conference drew another reference in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s keynote. These forums have drawn the Manifesto’s authors, scholars from the environmental humanities such as Stephen Muecke, scholar-activists like Margi Prideaux, IR theorists, and environmental politics scholars into a wide-ranging conversation. The dialogue has produced many interesting lines of disagreement, but it has been conducted in a spirit of civility and solidarity, based above all on a serious scholarly engagement with the Manifesto we wrote and the profound crisis of politics and ecology it engaged.
In response to the ‘non-manifesto’ penned by David Chandler, Stephen Hobden and Erika Cudworth, we advance five points in the coming pages. First, we deal with questions of nomenclature. We grapple with what is at stake in using the term ‘the Anthropocene’ and in bringing human politics into geological processes and timescales. Second, we counter Chandler et al.’s erroneous claim that ‘Planet Politics’ advances an occult liberal-imperialist agenda. Third, we refute their charge that our work smuggles in transcendentalism – a ‘God trick’ – by reiterating and underscoring the far-reaching notion of reflexivity that animated our original essay. Fourth, we defend the global-plural ethics of the Manifesto against the charge of ‘high-flying abstraction’, with our important argument – drawing on multiple cosmo-visions – that recognises earth and its changes as communicative. Fifth, we challenge their ‘bottom up’ vision of politics, explaining both that the Manifesto asserted a multiple politics that includes both resistance and governance, and that eco-centric reforms of international environmental law remain one important line of change. We conclude with a reminder about the ethos of the Manifesto.
Traps of Naming
We will first clarify our deployment of the concept of the Anthropocene – a geologic epoch – vis-à-vis International Relations, an academic discipline. Most would agree that IR is constellated around the question of survival first and foremost. In the Cold War, discussions of security focused on the avoidance of omnicidal nuclear war. Now, the climate and biodiversity crises present a predicament of similar scale, one that requires its own specialized modes of serious analysis. We argue that IR should be one of the academic disciplines best equipped to handle such discussions – but that, in its current form, it is unable to confront them, since they exceed its state- and anthro-pocentric boundary conditions.
Of course, claims to novelty need to be approached with appropriate scepticism, but as Dipesh Chakrabarty re-emphasised recently, the problems of climate change in particular, and the Anthropocene predicament in general, cannot be reduced simply to one more critique of globalisation. It is a rupture, not a Rorschach blot for one’s preferred social theory. The Anthropocene is a geological scale transition, and one whose future is open to being shaped by various forms of human action and other-than-human agency, even if it is unclear how that future can be made ‘sustainable’.
Further, the Anthropocene is a geological term that demands a planetary political, not only in terms of scale, but also in terms of the (changing) material conditions of earth. The Anthropocene is certainly driven by capitalism, whose causal powers must be placed under critique, but it also involves the transformation of the planet over a longer durée. The seeds of change were planted long before the rise of global capitalism, even if current commentators are right to focus on the sheer scale of the capitalist transformation. While capitalism is one of the main drivers of changes associated with the Anthropocene, longer-term trajectories of violence, including European colonialism, have also played an integral role in its development. The Manifesto argues that it is necessary to address the Anthropocene on these spatio-temporal registers – something that IR, in its current form, is not equipped to do. Nor, despite the crucial need for a focus specifically on production, is IPE yet up to the task.
We also differ from Chandler et al.’s outright rejection of the term ‘Anthropocene’ to understand the phenomena in question. While some of the Manifesto’s authors actively critique and dispute this term in various places, we contend that it gestures to an important set of discourses and debates that are shaping responses to planetary transformations. It is likely that Chandler et al., fall prey to the naming anxiety found in many recent articles on anthropogenically-induced climate change, and to the temptation to map the idea of the Anthropocene into existing social theory rather than acknowledge the paradigmatic shock it brings with it. The key insight of the idea, which no doubt induces profound theoretical anxiety, is serious and unprecedented change across all earth and human systems. A planetary disruption of this scale and nature is manifested and experienced in multiple forms and driven by various, converging forces: it demands multiple names. We follow McKenzie Wark: ‘Let’s have a thousand names for the Anthropocene…to make progress on the culture of climate change, it is important to keep open a path from everybody’s particular culture toward thinking and feeling it in their own terms…anything of this scale and complexity, not least emotional complexity, needs a whole poetics of its own’.
When the scientific literature on the Anthropocene is actually engaged – rather than the term appropriated for polemics that reinstate one’s preferred social theory – what emerges is a complicated series of transformations that cannot be reduced to either capitalism or the state system. These explain a great deal, to be sure, but the ‘Capitalocene’ obscures the responsibility of consumers, city planners, defence ministries and technologists as well. Davies puts the complexity better: ‘The geological Anthropocene is neither universalist nor technocratic, neither deterministic nor antipolitical. Rather than designating a general human footprint on the natural world, it implies only a network of evolutionary developments and ecological interactions’.
The Strange Case of the Missing Manifesto (1)
There is a serious problem at the heart of Chandler et. al.’s article: they were not in fact criticising the Manifesto we wrote, but a virtual text of their own invention. This was based on a caricatured version of what they want the Manifesto to be, rather than a careful reading of what it contains and intends. Of this style, Gilles Deleuze wrote: ‘And why do you bother reading me, if that’s how you feel? Arguments from one’s own privileged experience are bad and reactionary arguments’.
Rather than grapple with the core argument of the Manifesto – that the actuality and the causes of the global ecological crisis cannot be seen and responded to by either the discipline of International Relations or the institutional processes of international society, thus making them complicit in the crisis – Chandler et al., invent an argument we did not in fact make: that we are asserting a God-like, ‘securitized’ call for liberal imperialist forms of coercive, top-down governance and intervention that would trash global democracy and introduce new forms of inequality, violence and legal exceptionalism. This gross mischaracterisation is made worse by a bizarre association of our argument with the record of Blair and Bush in prosecuting the early years of the War on Terror, which we took to be something of a character assassination given its association with war crimes and torture.
Beyond this, their reading is mistaken on three counts. First, there is nothing in the Manifesto to indicate that we would support the use of military violence or any other form of lawless coercion in defence of the environment. While potential frameworks for prosecuting crimes against biodiversity would imply legal indictments and trial for individuals, they would be firmly anchored in the rule of law and due process. As much as we admire Robyn Eckersley’s political theory, we are not endorsing her argument for ecological intervention. Second, there is an inaccurate conflation of liberal imperialism, liberal internationalism, and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is mentioned in the Manifesto only once to evoke a general sense of global consciousness and solidarity. Rather, the operative conceptual figure is the idea of a ‘cosmopolitics’ that works for human and other-than-human beings and is simultaneously singular and plural, combining the universality of a common entangled existence on planet Earth and the particular and multiple differences of culture, gender, privilege, location, species and temporality. Third and finally, Chandler et al., fail to acknowledge the extensive scholarly critiques of liberal imperialism, liberal internationalism and the War on Terror published by the Manifesto’s authors, amounting to hundreds of thousands of words stretching over 16 years.
In a similar vein, we take issue with the claim that the Manifesto ignores questions of global inequality, which we in fact do engage more than once. We argue that ‘we must ask questions that are intimately connected to capitalism, modernity, and oppression’; refer to ‘communities from the Niger Delta to Bangladesh [that] are condemned to live in “sacrifice zones” devastated by oil drilling, mining, fracking, pollution, nuclear testing, and inundation’; and critique how the ‘dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon’, which requires a planetary politics ‘to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies’.
We would also clarify our statement that reads: ‘we need not focus on who is responsible’. This phrase does not suggest a lack of attention to the structures of violence and domination that drive ecological collapse, but rather a resounding rejection of Nietzschean ressentiment that would focus solely on assigning blame without moving towards positive futures. By no means do the authors of the Manifesto mean to suggest that the structures, corporations, states and individuals who have driven planetary collapse should be let off the hook. On the contrary, each part of the Manifesto clearly signals the parties responsible for various harms. Our point is that instead of focusing solely on assigning blame, it is necessary to provide constructive political options.
The Strange Case of the Missing Manifesto (2): Polyvocality, Reflexivity and the ‘God Trick’
Much of Chandler et al.’s critique seems to lie in their discomfort with multiplicity. By claiming that the Manifesto views legal processes as the only means of addressing ecological damage, and remarking that it simultaneously calls for reform and transformation, they argue that it makes for a ‘a confusing read’. What they appear to find so confusing is the polyvocality of the piece, one written by five authors embedded within distinct backgrounds, contexts, approaches and normative commitments. Yet the Manifesto did not purport to be the outline of a singular social theory. Rather, it embraced a plurality that included posthumanism, new materialisms, Earth system theory, and anti-colonialism – even the much-maligned cosmopolitanism. These we offered as possible responses to a multi-dimensional problem. In their desire to simplify a text that they find ‘confusing’, Chandler et al., have homogenized them – tendentiously – under the term ‘liberalism’.
Further, the Manifesto is an intervention toward and for an academic discipline (even if it looks backwards from that discipline’s ostensible ‘end’). The politics in which we are engaged are, in part, the politics of the academy, as these have been set down in the work of many scholars, past and present. Our aim was to indict IR for remaining tied to paradigmatic normative-methodological research ‘traditions’ that are so configured as to systematically overlook what Connolly has called The Fragility of Things: ‘the human estate in its multiple entanglements with other species and climate processes, calling upon us to overcome drives to cultural internalism in the humanities, sociocentrism in the human sciences, and anxious tendencies to studied indifference in the populace at large’. IR, we suggested, was guilty of this very kind of sociocentrism.
In keeping with the Millennium theme for that year, we suggested that this sociocentrism could be understood as a moral failure – an abdication of the social-scientific vocation. Why these normatively-laden terms? Because, like Max Weber, we understand the vocation of social science – in all its voices and modes – as the effort to marshal instrumental reason to address the improvement of a common lifeworld. That does not negate the possibility that terms like ‘improvement’, ‘common’, and ‘lifeworld’ might be essentially contested: they are. And yet, the work of social science remains: to embrace the fact of political diversity and essential contestation, even as one also upholds the vocation of practical reason. Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment must be read alongside Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’. Chandler et al. simply ignore this. Here, by way of reminder, is what we wrote:
In claiming the notion of a new planetary real, and in borrowing from the natural sciences, we do not claim the naïve position that the findings of those sciences are incontestable. Even less would we argue that descriptive claims drawn from such science have only one possible normative or political reading. Planet politics, in other words, does not claim to have transcended the limits of conceptual representation, solved the age-old epistemological problems of mediation and reification, or somehow leapt over the normative problems of identitarian thinking with its associated dangers for politics.
It is hard for us to see how such reflexivity embraces a series of imperial ‘zero point’ dictates and ahistorical ‘God tricks’ as Chandler et al., contend. If anything, the opposite: the whole point of a manifesto is to imagine a readership rooted in a particular place and time. As we wrote: ‘Our aim [is] to confront the field with an ontological shock, one that might provoke multiple forms of rethinking – of its actors, its structures, its purposes and its commitments’.
Perhaps this latter quote – the ‘ontological shock’ to which we refer – provides some clue as to the demons with which Chandler et al., are grappling. It is one thing to call for understandings that studiously reject any possibility of an understanding of the world that is not bound by the limitations of the horizons of one’s own thought. It is quite another – as Levine, drawing on Theodor Adorno in his 2012 book, has noted – to actually rearrange one’s thoughts to do this work. In that vein, that Chandler et al., seem to believe literally in the possibility of Adorno’s ‘self-conscious global subject’ – despite that thinker’s own repeated warning that such ideal-types were never actually to be found in the world, nor are their sensibilities literally enacted. One can only conclude that they have not succeeded in effecting this rearrangement.
Defending Earth’s Agency
Chandler et al., attack the idea that extinction should be framed as an issue of global ethics, claiming that this framing is not addressed, and then asking: ‘Which established political or philosophical traditions might we draw on that “embrace worldness” [sic]’ – the latter a term to which the authors paid so little attention as to misspell it. Caught up in their enthusiasm for reading the Manifesto as a piece of liberal propaganda, Chandler et al., appear to have overlooked explicit responses to these questions. The sections at which this critique is targeted clearly lay out the basis of this ethics in attunement to the plurality of worlds and also points to Indigenous philosophies as alternative ways of worlding.
The ‘high-flying abstraction’ of which Chandler et al., accuse us is read into the published words: they simply assume that ‘global ethics’ must be abstract and top-down, conveniently bracketing multiple references to the interactions of plural worlds and experiential ethics. By suggesting that the word ‘planet’ has simply replaced the term ‘global’, they impose their unwillingness to accept the literalism of the suggestion that the Earth and its multiple worlds can be political actors – an assumption often made by colonial thinkers in relation to Indigenous knowledge systems. Indeed, Chandler et al., grossly mischaracterise the Manifesto’s call to recognise various forms of earthly agency as a ‘top-down’ totalising approach that ignores agency.
In fact, they erroneously interpret the term ‘planet’ as a synonym for ‘humanity’ or ‘human agency’. As Mitchell has argued elsewhere – including in public follow-ups to the Manifesto – her contribution affirms the idea that earth and the multiple worlds it sustains are agents that engage in critique by laying bare the gap between dominant politics and their own realities. This idea is rooted in plural Indigenous philosophical systems in which, for instance, land and humans engage in co-thinking and constant communication; in which Country tells its human kin how and when to engage in activities such as burning brush/waste or fishing; and in which mountains/earth-/tirakuna actively shape politics.
Instead of engaging with these ideas, Chandler et al., dismiss the agencies of earth and the plural world it fosters, stating that attention to ‘what ‘the planet’ is ‘telling us’ would be comical if it were not articulated as a serious suggestion by well published and internationally respected critical theorists.’ The scare quotes around ‘the planet’ and ‘telling us’ evince a complete lack of understanding and respect for cosmo-visions that embrace the agency of earth and other beings. The upshot is a deeply colonial re-assertion of Western secular cosmo-visions and narratives, including the figure of ‘Gaia’, rooted in ancient Greek thought and revived by white European intellectuals as a Western feminised figure of earth.
From Declaration to Constitution: A Politics…that Includes Law
Our critics base their own response on a refusal: a refusal to fall back into reinforcing the international arena as the source of politics and policy-making. They say this after making the alarming statement that ‘politics cannot and should not be reduced to “the preservation and repair of ecological systems”’ and complaining that the ‘Planetary Manifesto forces debate onto the technical terms of what steps should or could be taken by global (planetary) governance bodies’. They assert that this contains ‘deeply authoritarian and de-politicising tendencies’ by conflating it with calls by some Earth scientists and eco-modernists for planetary geo-engineering. Let us be clear: the Manifesto indicates no support for geo-engineering. We are strongly opposed to it as hubristic and dangerous.
We are certainly aware that politics is about more than political ecology. What then are we to make of the extraordinary statement quoted above? Do our critics believe in the preservation and repair of ecological systems at all? These writers who have blazed the trail of post-human thinking in IR seem to have taken a bizarre turn against an eco-centric ethics and worldview, and now evince a refusal of the international as an actuality and a problem space for politics. In rightly referencing specific dangers of the Anthropocene discourse, they are actually refusing to grapple with the global and planetary scales on which it is manifest as an actuality. We feel compelled to remind them that the Earth’s atmosphere contains 120 parts per million of carbon dioxide more than it did in 1800; that every year global temperatures reach new records, and tropical cyclones become more intense; and that the major powers possess enough nuclear weaponry to wipe out much of life on planet Earth. As we say pointedly in the Manifesto, the statist and capitalist commitments of the international society of states have been deeply implicated in the creation and perseverance of the military, diplomatic and economic systems that have led the world to this impasse.
To demand an end to this kind of international relations, as we do, does not for a moment imply a refusal to acknowledge that such an international society exists, that the planetary scale on which the Anthropocene or the Capitalocene is manifest should not be grappled with at the same scale, or that we can walk away from the complexities of national and international policymaking and governance because some anarchist professor said so. This appears like a refusal of reality, which veers into political irresponsibility. One does not get to say that one dislikes international politics or law in the same way that one gets to say that one dislikes Hegel, action movies or sushi. International law is part of the wiring of the planet, it is integral to the structures that are transforming it, and any politics that is serious about dealing with the dangers of the Anthropocene must engage this law. To deny this is irresponsible because our inherited systems of international trade, climate, biodiversity and marine governance – let’s call them ‘actually existing environmental governance’ – are deeply implicated in perpetuating the ecological crisis that is a concern to so many, even as international environmental law is framed by strong normative statements of concern and is doing good in a number of areas.
Further, Burke and Fishel’s later proposals for new institutions and law are an immanent critique of the current governance order that are directly aimed at rapidly reducing greenhouse emissions and protecting biodiversity from the current cascade of extinctions. If adopted, a coal convention could eliminate up to 40 percent of global emissions, and create a precedent for a similar agreement to phase out oil and gas emissions. An Earth System Council and Crimes Against Biodiversity statute could add desperately needed clout to a weak and failing biodiversity protection regime.
Chandler et. al., are also wrong to claim that the Manifesto is solely a programme of ‘liberal’ global governance that discounts the value of deeper social change. We in fact argue that planet politics needs to be ‘simultaneously a practice of governance and of subversion, of regulation and resistance, at multiple scales and locales’. The Planet Politics we envision honours a 500-year tradition of Indigenous refusal of colonial violence and environmental racism – the politics of Standing Rock – as a source of radical change oriented towards the survival of the Earth’s life forms. It also sees avenues for change in the UN system, which needs to be inspired by and honour the struggles of communities and civil society. Efforts to change patterns of greenhouse emissions, deforestation, overfishing, pollution and biodiversity loss require regulation and law enforcement (including Indigenous and other non-Western forms of governance) allied to resistance and social change, at millions of points and communities. This involves a complex politics of distributed change that must be attentive to the need to involve communities, support indigenous rights and knowledge, and promote social justice.
There are affinities here with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s call for social and environmental movements to move ‘from declaration to constitution’ by constructing multiple ‘counterpowers’ that reconstitute democracy, utilise law to wield ‘the power of the judge against the King’, and connect mobile and networked forms of popular organisation to ensure that change will not be hollowed out by institutional capture.
Chandler et al.’s ‘bottom up’ politics, while not entirely without value, has little to offer when dealing with global-scale forms of ecological degradation and corporate suborning of democracy. Nor does it support systems of law and justice that can respond and, it is hoped, prevent, the murder of hundreds of environmental defenders for their own very ‘bottom-up’ efforts to save and protect ecologies.
We envisage Planet Politics as a capacious umbrella under which many kinds of intellectual inquiry and political practice could work seriously on reversing the political, economic and ecological degradation now overtaking planet Earth. The Manifesto, based on this idea of Planet Politics, defines ethics and responses in both broad strokes and finer detail.
We hope the change of tone in an academic article will demonstrate our commitment to open the field to different ways of communicating its ethics and commitments. We do so in a spirit of collaboration, of ante-, post-, trans-, multi- and cross-disciplinarity, to disrupt academic silos and the neoliberal direction of modern knowledge and life.
We defend the Manifesto robustly, both to ward off a destructive misreading of it, and to reiterate the urgency of its ecological politics and sensibility. We wish that it had been read more faithfully, and that the substantive disagreements between our positions had been explored with greater respect and solidarity; or, even better, that our critics had written their ‘non-manifesto for the Capitalocene’ with the range, depth and positivity that such a work deserves. We would welcome it. As academics and as (ever more problematic) human beings, we need kinship that creates accomplices across beliefs, experiences, disciplines, borders, species, and worlds. As Rosi Braidotti says: ‘we-are-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one’. It is in such a spirit we write.
 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, Negotiations (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995), 4.
 Anthony Burke et al., ‘Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 499–523.
 Audra Mitchell, ‘Is IR Going Extinct?’ European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1 (2016): 3–25.
 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Politics of Climate Change is More than the Politics of Capitalism’, Theory, Culture and Society 34, no. 2–3 (2017): 25–37.
 Jason Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (London: Verso, 2015); Simon Dalby, ‘Climate Security in the Anthropocene: “Scaling up” the Human Niche’, in Reimagining Climate Change, eds. Paul Wapner and Hilal Elver (New York: Routledge, 2016): 29–48.
 Simon L. Lewis and Mark A. Maslin, ‘Defining the Anthropocene’, Nature 519 (2016): 171–80.
 McKenzie Wark, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Bourgeois Novel in the Anthropocene’, Verso [Blog], 16 August 2017. Available at: https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3356-on-the-obsolescence-of-the-bourgeois-novel-in-the-anthropocene. Last accessed November 8, 2017.
 Simon Dalby, ‘Contextual Changes in Earth History: From the Holocene to the Anthropocene: Implications for the Goal of Sustainable Development and for Strategies of Sustainable Transition’, in Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace Handbook, eds. Hans Günter Brauch et al., (Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 67–88.
 Jeremy Davies, The Birth of the Anthropocene (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), 76.
 Deleuze, ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, 12.
 Chandler et al., ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Liberal Cosmopolitanism: A Reply to Burke et al.’s “Planet Politics”’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 46, no. 2 (2017).
 Anthony Burke’s wider work in political theory and security studies draws on the anthropocentric tradition of cosmopolitan political thought, but throughout is painstakingly distinguished from liberal internationalism and rooted in a cosmic, rather than humanist, ontology to the point that scholars have asserted it is better understood as a form of ‘cosmopolitics’. Audra Mitchell, ‘Is IR Going Extinct?’ European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1 (2016): 3–25; Anthony Burke, ‘The Good State, from a Cosmic Point of View’, International Politics 50, no. 1 (2013): 57–76; Anthony Burke, ‘Humanity after Biopolitics: On the Global Politics of Human Being’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 16, no. 4 (2011): 101–14.
 Inter alia, Stefanie Fishel, ‘Theorizing Violence in the Responsibility to Protect’, Critical Studies on Security 1, no. 2 (2013): 204–18; Anthony Burke, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against the Other (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Anthony Burke, ‘Against the New Internationalism’, Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 73–89; Audra Mitchell, International Intervention in a Secular Age: Re-Enchanting Humanity? (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Daniel Levine, Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Simon Dalby, ‘Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America’s New War’, Geopolitics 8, no. 3 (2003): 61–86; Simon Dalby, ‘Geopolitics, the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Bush Doctrine’, International Politics 46, no. 2–3 (2009): 234–52.
 Burke et al., ‘Planet Politics’, 500–17.
William E. Connolly, ‘The Anthropocene, Obama, and the Politics of Swarming’, The Contemporary Condition [Blog]. Available at: http://contemporarycondition.blogspot.com/2014/11/william-e.html. Last accessed November 8, 2017.
 Burke et al., ‘Planet Politics’, 520.
 Elizabeth Povinelli, ‘Do Rocks Listen? The Cultural Politics of Apprehending Australian Aboriginal Labour’, American Anthropologist 97, no. 3 (1995): 505–18.
 Audra Mitchell, ‘We Need a Politics of Worlds’, josephcamilleri.org, ‘Can World Politics Save Planet Earth?’ Available at: http://www.josephcamilleri.org/forum/can-world-politics-save-planet-earth. Last accessed November 7, 2017; Audra Mitchell, ‘A Politics of Worlds’, Available at: https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/. Last accessed November 7, 2017.
 Vanessa Watts, ‘Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency Amongst Humans and Nonhumans (First Woman and Sky Woman go on a European World Tour!)’ Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society 2, no. 1 (2017): 20–34; Joe Sheridan and Roronhiakewen, ‘He Clears the Sky’, Dan Longboat, ‘The Haudenosaunee Imagination and the Ecology of the Sacred’, Space and Culture 9, no. 4 (2006): 365–81.
 Bawaka Country et al., ‘Co-becoming Bawaka: Towards a Relational Understanding of Place/Space’, Progress in Human Geography, published online first June 30, 2015; Laklak Burarrwanga and Family, Welcome to My Country (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2013).
 Marisol de la Cadena, Earth Beings: Ecologies of Practice Across Andean Worlds (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
 Chandler et al., ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Liberal Cosmopolitanism’, 9.
 Burke, et al., ‘Planet Politics’, 507.
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Declaration (New York: Argo Navis Author Services, 2012), 1, 52–9.
 Linda Sheehan and Grant Wilson, Fighting for Our Shared Future: Protecting Both Human Rights and Nature’s Rights (New York: Earth Law Center, 2015 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/ImplementationReport/Earth%20Law%20Center.pdf).